Savings Groups, Women's Empowerment and Community Development: Evidence from USAID-Supported Village Savings and Loan Associations in Awka North, Anambra State, Nigeria

to members of USAID-supported VSLAs operating there at the time of the study. Sample size was determined using the standard formula for proportions (Godden, 2004): n = Z2p(1 − p) / C2 = (1.96)2(0.5)(0.5) / (0.05)2 = 384.16 where Z = 1.96 (95% confidence), p = 0.5 (maximum variability) and C = 0.05 (margin of error). The conservative sample size was set at 384. A multi-stage procedure was used. In stage one, the LGA's villages were stratified by the four clans. In stage two, four villages per clan with active VSLAs were purposively selected, giving 16 villages (Table 1). In stage three, the names of VSLAs in each selected village were written on slips and drawn at random, three groups per village (48 groups in all), and 24 women were drawn per village, giving 96 per clan and 384 in total. Table 1. Sampling frame and selected villages Clan Villages in clan Villages selected Selected villages Questionnaires administered Amansea 23 4 Amaowelle, Egbeagu, Okikwa, Orebe 96 Achalla 23 4 Umudiani, Amukabia, Odawa, Udezu 96 Mgbakwu 14 4 Amankpu, Anawayi, Amaezike, Amede 96 Ebenebe 19 4 Uwuajana, Uwuji, Umiogbuefi, Umuoye 96 jpaswr Clan Villages in clan Villages selected Selected villages Questionnaires administered Total 79 16 384 3.4 Instrument, validity and reliability Data were collected with a structured questionnaire in five sections: socio-demographic characteristics (Section A) and four sections corresponding to the study objectives (Sections B to E), covering household impact, access to savings and loans, solidarity and sustainability. Items were mainly closed-ended (yes/no and categorical options). Face and content validity were established by giving a draft to experts in sociology, political science, economics and the wider social sciences, whose comments were incorporated in the final version. Reliability was assessed by test–retest: the instrument was administered to 18 women (six in each of three villages outside the study area with similar characteristics) and re-administered after two weeks. Pearson's product-moment correlation between the two sets of scores was r = .81, indicating strong stability. 3.5 Data collection and ethics Data were collected by the lead researcher and two research assistants trained for one day on research ethics, confidentiality, informed consent, questionnaire administration and data management. Letters of introduction were presented to village and VSLA leaders, who introduced the team to group members. Verbal informed consent was obtained from each participant. Respondents who were able completed the questionnaire themselves, while non- literate respondents were interviewed by a member of the team. Completion took 4 to 10 minutes, and fieldwork lasted six weeks. Questionnaires were numbered 1 to 384 to avoid duplication. Participants were assured of anonymity and confidentiality, informed that participation was voluntary and that the exercise was for academic purposes, and told that no harm was anticipated, although the process might be mildly stressful. [Insert institutional ethical clearance reference, if applicable, and the fieldwork year.] 3.6 Data analysis Questionnaires were checked for completeness and consistency, coded and analysed quantitatively. Frequencies and percentages summarised respondent characteristics and responses. Chi-square tests of independence at the 5% level of significance (α = .05) were used to test H1 to H3, using clan as the grouping variable (df = 3 for each 4 × 2 table), and Cramér's V was computed as an effect-size measure (conventionally, .10 small, .20 to .30 moderate). Because all respondents were VSLA members, the tests assess whether reported outcomes are homogeneous across clans; they do not compare members with non-members, and the results are interpreted accordingly. 4. Results 4.1 Response rate and respondent profile Of 384 questionnaires distributed, 377 were returned and 19 were voided because of incomplete or improper completion, leaving 358 valid questionnaires and an effective response rate of 93.2% (Table 2). This is well above the 70% threshold commonly regarded as very good for survey research (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). jpaswr Table 2. Questionnaire administration and response by clan Clan Administered Retrieved Voided Valid Amansea 96 96 3 93 Achalla 96 95 5 90 Mgbakwu 96 94 5 89 Ebenebe 96 92 6 86 Total 384 377 19 358 Table 3 summarises respondent characteristics. Respondents were in their economically active years (mean age 40.5 years), with the modal age group being 38 to 47 years (33.8%). Fewer than half (46.1%) were married, and 29.3% were divorced, separated or widowed, which indicates that many respondents were the main or sole providers in their households. Most had secondary (45.8%) or primary (29.3%) education, and 41.6% were self-employed. Household size was mostly 3 to 6 members (50.3%) or 7 to 10 members (46.1%). Respondents were overwhelmingly Christian (95.3%). Just over half (53.9%) had been VSLA members for 2 to 5 years and 34.1% for six years or more, so most had experienced at least one full saving cycle. Table 3. Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents (N = 358) Characteristic n % Age 18–27 40 11.2 28–37 102 28.5 38–47 121 33.8 48–57 78 21.8 58–67 17 4.7 Marital status Single 88 24.6 Married 165 46.1 Divorced/separated 67 18.7 Widowed 38 10.6 Education No formal education 17 4.7 Primary 105 29.3 Secondary 164 45.8 Tertiary 72 20.1 Employment status Unemployed 133 37.2 Self-employed 149 41.6 Employed 76 21.2 Household size 3–6 members 180 50.3 7–10 members 165 46.1 11–14 members 13 3.6 Length of VSLA membership Less than one year 43 12.0 2–5 years 193 53.9 jpaswr Characteristic n % 6–9 years 94 26.3 10 years or more 28 7.8 Note. Mean age = 40.5 years. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. 4.2 Savings behaviour and household outcomes Before VSLAs were introduced, nearly half of respondents (46.4%) kept their savings at home, 24.3% used banks, 21.2% held savings in assets such as livestock or goods, and 8.1% did not save (Table 4). After joining, 70.9% reported saving more, 17.6% about the same and 11.5% less. A large majority (85.5%) expressed confidence in saving with their group, and 97.2% appreciated the introduction of VSLAs in their community. On household impact, 64.5% reported improvements in food security, health care and education combined; a further 19.3%, 8.4% and 7.8% reported improvements in food security, education and health respectively. Nevertheless, when asked directly whether VSLA membership had improved their household conditions, 60.9% answered yes and 39.1% no, a more guarded verdict than the near-universal appreciation of the programme. Table 4. Savings behaviour and household outcomes (N = 358) Item and response n % Where savings were kept before VSLA At home 166 46.4 In banks 87 24.3 In assets 76 21.2 Did not save 29 8.1 Savings compared with before joining Saved more 254 70.9 About the same 63 17.6 Saved less 41 11.5 Confidence in saving with VSLA Yes 306 85.5 No 52 14.5 Appreciates introduction of VSLA Yes 348 97.2 No 10 2.8 Main household impact Improved food security 69 19.3 Met basic health needs 28 7.8 Improved access to education 30 8.4 All of the above 231 64.5 VSLA improved household conditions Yes 218 60.9 No 140 39.1 4.3 Access to credit and enterprise development Credit access was a clear area of change (Table 5). Before joining, 58.1% of respondents had no jpaswr access to credit in an emergency; after joining, 75.7% reported being able to obtain loans when needed. Two-thirds (66.2%) said VSLAs had increased their access to savings and loan options for starting or growing a business. Among respondents, 12.6% used loans to start a business, 24.6% to invest in an existing business, and 46.4% for a combination of enterprise and consumption purposes; only 8.9% used loans solely for consumption. Taken together, 83.6% used loans at least partly for business purposes, although 7.5% reported none of the listed uses. Table 5. Access to credit and use of loans (N = 358) Item and response n % Access to emergency credit before joining Yes 150 41.9 No 208 58.1 Access to credit/loans as a member Yes 271 75.7 No 87 24.3 VSLA increased access to savings and loans for business Yes 237 66.2 No 121 33.8 Use of loans Start a business 45 12.6 Invest in an existing business 88 24.6 Consumption 32 8.9 All of the above 166 46.4 None of the above 27 7.5 4.4 Solidarity, voice and sustainability Indicators of social cohesion were uniformly high (Table 6). Most respondents (72.6%) said their group showed concern for members' welfare beyond saving, 86.9% felt at ease contributing opinions at meetings, and 87.2% believed women's participation in VSLAs had increased community solidarity. Wider civic participation was also high: 91.6% had attended village or clan meetings in addition to VSLA meetings, which suggests that VSLA membership is embedded in, rather than substituting for, existing community structures. Group composition was socially homogeneous, with 94.4% reporting that members share a similar socio-economic background. All respondents reported that their groups were involved in community projects and that there were plans to sustain the groups beyond the close-out of USAID's implementing partners. Table 6. Solidarity, participation and sustainability (N = 358) Item Yes n (%) No n (%) Group shows concern for members' welfare 260 (72.6) 98 (27.4) Comfortable contributing opinions in VSLA meetings 311 (86.9) 47 (13.1) Participated in village/clan meetings beyond VSLA 328 (91.6) 30 (8.4) Women's VSLA participation increased community solidarity 312 (87.2) 46 (12.8) Members share similar socio-economic background 338 (94.4) 20 (5.6) Group involved in community projects 358 (100.0) 0 (0.0) jpaswr Item Yes n (%) No n (%) Plan to sustain VSLAs beyond partner close-out 358 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 4.5 Tests of association by clan Table 7 presents the distribution of key outcomes by clan together with the chi-square results. Expected frequencies exceeded 5 in all cells, satisfying the test's assumptions. Table 7. Perceived outcomes by clan and chi-square tests (N = 358) Outcome Amansea (n = 93) Achalla (n = 90) Mgbakw u (n = 89) Ebenebe (n = 86) χ2(3) p Cramér's V H1: Household conditions improved (% yes) 69.9 68.9 44.9 59.3 15.19 .002 .21 H2: Increased access to savings and loans for business (% yes) 64.5 73.3 48.3 79.1 21.26 < .001 .24 H3: Increased community solidarity (% yes) 87.1 80.0 91.0 90.7 6.26 .10 .13 Note. The 5% critical value for χ2 with 3 degrees of freedom is 7.815. H1. The calculated χ2 of 15.19 exceeds the critical value of 7.815, so the null hypothesis was rejected: perceived improvement in household conditions differed significantly by clan (p = .002, V = .21). Respondents in Amansea (69.9%) and Achalla (68.9%) were most likely to report improvement, while those in Mgbakwu (44.9%) were least likely. H2. The calculated χ2 of 21.26 also exceeds the critical value, so the null hypothesis was rejected (p < .001, V = .24). Reported gains in business-related access to savings and loans were highest in Ebenebe (79.1%) and Achalla (73.3%) and lowest in Mgbakwu (48.3%). H3. The calculated χ2 of 6.26 is below the critical value, so the null hypothesis was retained: perceived solidarity did not differ significantly across clans (p = .10, V = .13). Solidarity was reported by a large majority in every clan (80.0% to 91.0%). 5. Discussion 5.1 Savings, credit and household welfare The findings are consistent with the central claim of the VSLA literature that savings groups expand basic financial access for people the formal system does not serve. Most respondents had previously saved at home or in assets, which are insecure and illiquid, and most now report saving more with greater confidence in the safety of their funds. These results echo experimental and observational evidence of increased savings and improved consumption smoothing (Beaman et al., 2014; Karlan et al., 2017; Ksoll et al., 2016). The shift in emergency credit access from 41.9% to 75.7% is especially important in a setting of seasonal agriculture and informal trade, where shocks such as illness or crop loss can force asset sales (Allen & Panetta, 2010). The use of loans, with more than four in five respondents directing them at least partly to enterprise, indicates that VSLAs are functioning as a source of working capital for micro-enterprise, in line with earlier findings from Zanzibar and Tanzania (Anyango et al., 2007; Brannen, 2010; Kesanta & André, 2015). jpaswr The results on household welfare are more nuanced than the headline figures suggest. Almost all respondents appreciated VSLAs, and 64.5% reported combined benefits in food, health and education, yet only 60.9% affirmed that household conditions had improved. Appreciation of a programme is not equivalent to measurable welfare change, and the 39.1% who did not report improvement are a reminder that the benefits of savings groups are not automatic. This pattern accords with the broader microfinance literature, which finds that financial access translates into welfare gains conditionally, depending on how women use resources, on household dynamics and on market opportunities (Duflo, 2012; Johnson, 2004; Kabeer, 2005). It also reflects a recurring finding of the randomised studies: strong effects on financial behaviour, more modest effects on income and assets (Karlan et al., 2017). 5.2 Uneven outcomes across clans The significant clan differences for household improvement and enterprise-related access (H1 and H2) are the study's most distinctive result. Mgbakwu clan stands out: fewer than half of respondents there reported improved household conditions (44.9%) or increased enterprise access (48.3%), compared with 59% to 79% elsewhere. The effect sizes are small to moderate, so the differences should not be overstated, but they are consistent and substantively meaningful. The survey did not collect data on the reasons, and any explanation is necessarily provisional. Plausible factors include differences in group maturity and governance, distance to markets and to other financial services, local economic structure, and the intensity of implementing-partner support. These are conditions that the SLA treats as part of the vulnerability context and the transforming structures that mediate whether financial assets convert into livelihood outcomes (Scoones, 1998). The result supports a practical point: treating an LGA as a homogeneous programme area can mask pockets in which the model underperforms, and monitoring should therefore be disaggregated below the LGA level. The lack of a significant clan difference in perceived solidarity (H3) indicates a shared experience of cohesion. Two interpretations are possible. First, VSLA mechanisms, such as the social fund, collective rules and meetings in which all transactions are conducted openly, may reliably produce trust and mutual support (Allen & Staehle, 2007; Cheston & Kuhn, 2002). Second, solidarity may reflect pre-existing social cohesion in culturally homogeneous communities, where members already know one another and attend village and clan meetings (91.6%). Because the study has no non-member comparison or baseline, it cannot distinguish between these explanations. The very high share of respondents reporting a similar socio- economic background (94.4%) also implies that groups are largely bonding rather than bridging forms of social capital, which supports mutual insurance but may limit access to wider networks, information and markets. 5.3 Empowerment The data provide indirect rather than direct evidence on empowerment. In Kabeer's (1999) terms, the findings speak most clearly to resources (savings, credit and enterprise capital) and, more tentatively, to agency (86.9% feel at ease expressing opinions in group meetings). That 91.6% already participate in village and clan meetings suggests that women in this setting may have had a degree of civic presence before VSLA membership, which cautions against attributing voice solely to the programme. No item measured control over loan use, household decision-making or asset ownership, so the study cannot show that increased resources have been converted into greater decision-making power. This limits the strength of empowerment claims and is consistent jpaswr with scholarly caution that financial participation is necessary but not sufficient for empowerment (Eyben et al., 2008; Malhotra et al., 2002; Weber & Ahmad, 2014). 5.4 Sustainability The unanimous report that groups are involved in community projects and that plans exist to continue beyond donor close-out is encouraging and consistent with the model's design features: self-capitalisation, simple procedures and negligible operating cost (Allen, 2006; Hendricks & Chidiac, 2011). In SLA terms, this suggests that groups are perceived as a durable institutional asset. However, unanimity warrants cautious interpretation. Responses may reflect social desirability or acquiescence, particularly where respondents were approached through group leaders and where interviewer administration was used for non-literate women. Stated intentions are not evidence of realised continuity, and the content and credibility of the plans were not analysed here. Post-project follow-up would be needed to establish whether groups persist, whether they reconstitute after share-out and whether they attain linkages with formal institutions. 6. Policy and Programme Implications Four implications follow from the findings. Disaggregate monitoring and tailor support. Because outcomes differed across clans, implementing partners and government agencies should monitor results by clan or village and direct additional facilitation, refresher training and market linkage support to areas such as Mgbakwu where fewer members report gains. Diagnostic follow-up should establish whether the causes lie in group governance, market access or local economic conditions. Build linkages to formal finance. Group capital is bounded by members' saving capacity, and the homogeneity of groups limits bridging social capital. Facilitating linkages between mature groups and banks or microfinance institutions, for example through an umbrella association of VSLAs that can negotiate access to financial services, inputs and markets, would widen product choice and enable successful groups to move from consumption smoothing to productive investment (Allen, 2006; Hendricks & Chidiac, 2011). Strengthen agency, not only access. Since the findings do not demonstrate that financial resources translate into decision-making power, programmes should combine savings with financial literacy, business skills and gender-awareness components, and should involve male household members and community leaders so that gains in resources are not offset by constraints on women's control over them (Eyben et al., 2008; Kabeer, 1999). Plan for sustainability deliberately. Close-out should be a managed process that includes training of village agents, documentation of constitutions and procedures, and mechanisms for periodic verification that groups reconstitute after share-outs. Groups that already invest in community projects could be supported to formalise bylaws governing collective contributions, so that social and economic functions reinforce one another. 7. Limitations and Directions for Future Research Several limitations qualify the conclusions. First, the design is cross-sectional and all respondents were VSLA members; without a comparison group or baseline, the study documents perceived outcomes and variation between clans but cannot establish that VSLA participation caused them. Second, outcomes were measured with single self-reported items and, for pre- membership conditions, rely on recall; responses may be subject to social desirability bias, jpaswr especially for the unanimous sustainability responses and where interviews were conducted with non-literate respondents. Third, villages were purposively selected for the presence of VSLAs, which restricts generalisation beyond comparable communities. Fourth, bivariate chi-square tests do not control for age, education, marital status, household size or length of membership, all of which may confound clan differences, and the study did not use a validated multidimensional empowerment index. Finally, the data do not explain why clans differ. Future research should use quasi-experimental or longitudinal designs with non-member comparison groups, apply validated empowerment measures such as indicators of control over income, assets and household decisions, use multivariable models, and combine surveys with qualitative methods to explain intra-LGA variation. Follow-up studies after partner withdrawal would provide the evidence needed to judge whether donor-initiated groups are sustained, and replication in other states would test the findings' wider relevance. 8. Conclusion This study examined how participation in USAID-supported VSLAs relates to household conditions, enterprise finance, solidarity and sustainability among women in Awka North LGA. Members reported higher savings, greater confidence in saving, improved access to emergency and enterprise credit, and strong group cohesion, and they unanimously expressed intentions to sustain the groups beyond the project cycle. At the same time, perceived household improvement and enterprise-related access varied significantly across clans, with Mgbakwu lagging, whereas solidarity was high everywhere. The results support the view that VSLAs are an effective means of extending basic financial services to rural women, while also showing that their benefits are not uniform and that evidence of empowerment in the fuller sense of agency remains indirect. For policy and practice, the implication is to pair the low-cost VSLA model with locally tailored support, links to formal finance, deliberate attention to women's agency, and structured planning for post-project continuity. jpaswr References Allen, H. (2006). Village savings and loans associations: Sustainable and cost-effective rural finance. Small Enterprise Development, 17(1), 61–68. Allen, H., & Panetta, D. (2010). Savings groups: What are they? SEEP Network. Allen, H., & Staehle, M. (2007). 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